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Highlights
•	 Projects	of	common	interest	are	important	high-value	projects	for	achieving	
EU	 energy	 and	 climate	 policy	 objectives.	To	 the	 extent	 that	 these	 projects	
have	higher	risks,	we	need	to	make	sure	that	the	regulatory	frameworks	also	
incentivize	investment	at	the	high	end	of	the	risk	spectrum.
•	 In	 this	 brief	 we	 discuss	 whether	 an	 adequate	 framework	 for	 projects	 of	
common	interest	implies	moving	towards	a	dedicated	regulatory	framework,	
concluding	that	this	is	not	necessarily	necessary.
•	 Some	Member	States	might	prefer	 to	apply	 their	default	 regulatory	 frame-










•	 In	both	cases,	 the	EU	and	ACER	have	 important	 roles	 to	play	 in	ensuring	
that	 the	 regulatory	 framework	 applying	 to	 projects	 of	 common	 interest	 is	
adequate.	 Their	 roles	 could	 include	 assessing	 the	 applicable	 frameworks,	
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Background
The	default	national	regulatory	frameworks	that	apply	to	trans-
mission	 system	 operator	 (TSO)	 investments	 predominantly	
provide	 the	 same	 return	 to	 all	 electricity	 infrastructure	 pro-
jects,	 irrespective	of	 their	 value	 and	 irrespective	of	 their	 risk	
profile.	 If	 transmission	planning	works	well,	 only	 high-value	
projects	are	retained	for	investment,	but	they	can	be	very	het-
erogeneous	in	terms	of	their	risk	profile.	Therefore,	the	higher	
the	 return	 that	applies	 to	all	 investments,	 the	higher	 the	 risk	
of	overpaying	 for	 low-risk	high-value	projects,	 but	 the	 lower	
the	return	on	 investment,	 the	higher	 the	risk	of	underpaying	
for	 high-risk	 high-value	 projects.	 Moreover,	 independent	 of	
the	level	of	return,	the	current	practice	implies	a	bias	towards	
low-risk	 projects	 and	 delays	 or	 leads	 to	 underinvestment	 in	
high-risk	 projects	 that	 in	 some	 cases	 can	 be	 very	 important	
electricity	infrastructure	projects.
The	 fundamental	 problem	 of	 the	 default	 national	 regulatory	
frameworks	applies	especially	to	projects	of	common	interest.	
Indeed,	these	projects	tend	to	be	riskier	than	an	average	project	
for	 two	main	 reasons.	First,	 they	are	 typically	multi-jurisdic-
tion	projects	involving	multiple	authorities.	Such	projects	typi-
cally	take	longer	to	develop	in	terms	of	permit	granting,	cost	
approval,	project	 routing	etc.,	 leading	 to	higher	development	
cost	 risk.	 Second,	 projects	 of	 common	 interest	 tend	 to	 be	 of	
larger	 scale	and	use	more	 innovative	 technology,	 like	HVDC	
submarine	 cables,	 leading	 to	 higher	 construction	 cost	 risks.	
Despite	 the	 higher	 cost	 uncertainty,	 we	 want	 these	 projects	
to	 be	 built	 because	 they	 are,	 by	 definition1,	 strongly	 welfare	
improving	 for	Europe	and	of	 strategic	 importance	 to	achieve	
the	EU	climate	and	energy	policy	objectives.	




we	 argue	 that	 it	 could	 be	 left	 to	 the	 national	 level	 to	 decide	
whether	or	not	to	develop	such	a	dedicated	framework,	but	in	
both	cases	there	is	a	role	for	the	EU	and	ACER	to	ensure	that	





procedure	 for	 evaluating	 and	 selecting	 projects	 of	 common	 interest:	
Meeus,	L.,	von	der	Fehr,	N.H.,	Azevedo,	I.,	He,	X.,	Olmos,	L.,	Glachant,	
J.M.,	 2013.	Cost	 Benefit	Analysis	 in	 the	Context	 of	 the	 Energy	 Infra-





countries	 have	 introduced	 dedicated	 regulatory	 frameworks	
for	 important	 electricity	 infrastructure	 investments.	We	 then	





1. Why some countries have introduced 
dedicated regulatory frameworks for 
important electricity infrastructure 
investments
At	first	sight,	the	dedicated	frameworks	seem	to	be	motivated	
by	 temporary	 exceptional	 challenges.	Countries	 refer	 to	pro-
moting	 competition,	 electricity	 market	 integration	 or	 prior-
itizing	strategically	important	or	socially	desirable	investment	












jects	 they	 consider	 important	 and	 thus	 eligible.	The	 projects	
countries	have	in	mind	have	higher	risks:	they	are	multi-juris-
dictional	(interconnectors);	larger	scale	(large	domestic	lines);	
or	 more	 innovative	 (off-shore	 lines,	 electricity	 storage)	 than	
traditional	 investment.	 Some	 countries	 even	 mention	 these	
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Box 1: Countries background
 Italy 
Introduced: 2004; 
Motivation: speeding up investment for national strategy to 
promote competition, but framework also followed in the after-
math of a countrywide blackout on 28 September 2003; 
Eligible investment: interconnectors and congestion reducing 




Motivation: a major blackout on 14 August 2003, decades of 
declining infrastructure investment, and inadequacy of the 
default regulatory framework; 
Eligible investment: interstate investment for improving 
regional reliability and reducing regional congestion.
 Germany 
Introduced: 2007; 
Motivation: speeding up significant grid expansion of superior 
public interest (e.g. Energiewende);  
Eligible investment: cross-regional, cross-border and off-shore 
grid expansion.
 The Netherlands 
Introduced: 2010;
Motivation: facilitating large investment that is socially desir-
able;
Eligible investment: all grid expansion necessary for achieving 
energy policy objectives. 
 UK 
Introduced: 2011; 
Motivation: speeding up EU market integration, promote com-
mercially-driven investment (an alternative to the “exemption” 
track), addressing the coordination risk of multi-jurisdictional 
projects, and adjusting remuneration to the higher risks of this 
type of investment;
Eligible investment: NEMO (Belgium-UK interconnector) and 
future subsea interconnectors.
 France
Introduced: 2013 (only first principles); 
Motivation: EU market integration, addressing additional com-
plexity of multi-jurisdictional projects, moving towards value-
driven remuneration;
Eligible investment: interconnectors.
2. Main differences between the dedicated 
regulatory frameworks for important 
electricity infrastructure investments 
and the default national frameworks 

















to	 just	 four	years	 in	the	default	national	regulatory	frame-
work.	Additionally,	Italy	gives	a	fixed	premium	on	the	return	
on	investment	of	two	percent	to	all	eligible	investment.	
•	 France	 has	 extended	 the	 regulatory	 period	 of	 its	 planned	
dedicated	 framework	 to	 ten	 years.	 It	 is	 also	 planning	 to	
increase	 the	 return	on	 investment	 for	 important	high-risk	
projects	 by	 giving	 a	 combination	 of	 a	 flat	 lump-sum	 pre-
mium	and	variable	bonuses	and	penalties	that	will	be	estab-
lished	 after	 a	 case-by-case	 assessment	 of	 the	 investment’s	
value.
•	 The	UK	and	the	US	both	have	defined	a	regulatory	period	
that	 in	 principle	 matches	 the	 lifetime	 of	 the	 important	
investment	with	twenty	five	years	for	the	UK	and	an	unde-
fined	period	for	the	US,	respectively.	Both	also	advance	the	
approval	 for	 cost	 recovery	 on	 certain	 development	 costs	
such	as	study	costs.	The	US	additionally	foresees	in	progres-
sive	recovery	of	construction	costs	while	the	project	is	under	
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In	addition,	these	countries	have	also	taken	measures	to	keep	











competences	 to	 do	 this	 and	 is	 now	 assessing	 all	 projects	
claiming	additional	incentives	under	the	dedicated4	frame-
work.	It	reviews	evidence	of	the	project	eligibility,	and	jus-
tification	 for	 additional	 incentives	 to	 complete	 the	project	
(see	Box	2).	




Table 1: Country experiences with dedicated regulatory frameworks for important electricity infrastructure 
investments
Reduced investment risk for important high-risk projects
Exemption from default capex efficiency 
benchmarking
v v
Increasing regulatory period v v v v
Advance timing of development cost 
recognition
v v
Advance timing of construction cost 
recognition
v v v
Increased return on investment for important high-risk projects
Fixed premium v
Case-by-case premium v v v
Controlling cost efficiency (avoid overpaying)
Assessment of eligibility v v v
Case-by-case assessment of eligibility, 
reduction of investment  risk and 
increase of return on investment
v v v
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A	case-by-case	approach	is	superior,	especially	if	the	risk	pro-
files	 of	 the	 projects	 are	 very	 heterogeneous.	 A	 case-by-case	
assessment	 indeed	 allows	mitigating	 the	 risk	 of	 underpaying	




is	 subject	 to	 the	 same	 deficiencies	 as	 the	 default	 regulatory	







3. The role of the EU and ACER to ensure 
an adequate regulatory framework for 





Member states without a dedicated regulatory frame-
work for important investments
NRAs	might	prefer	 to	apply	 their	default	national	 regulatory	
framework	 to	projects	of	 common	 interest,	motivated	by	 the	
advantage	of	a	simple	framework	and	by	the	avoidance	of	the	
costs	 to	 administer	 additional	 dedicated	 frameworks	 and	 to	
develop	new	skills.6
This	could	be	 justified	 in	member	states	with	 few	projects	of	
common	 interest	 that	 are	 not	 significantly	 more	 risky	 than	
other	 investments;	 or	 in	 member	 states	 with	 predominantly	
multi-jurisdictional	 investments	 so	 that	 all	 investments	 are	





5.	 The	 “Deliberation	 of	 the	 French	Energy	Regulatory	Commission	 of	 3	
April	 2013	deciding	on	 the	 tariffs	 for	 the	use	of	 a	high-voltage	public	
electricity	 grid”,	 for	 instance,	 foresees	 variable	 bonuses	 and	 penalties	
linked	to	the	project’s	performance	that	can	even	become	negative	to	the	
extent	that	the	flat	lump-sum	premium	on	return	is	reduced	or	negated.
6.	 E-Control,	 2014.	 Financing	 of	 Infrastructure	 Projects	 -	 Provision	 of	
adequate	Incentives	for	PCIs.	Position	Paper.	
Box 2: FERC experience with case-by-case 
assessment
Section 219 of the Federal Power Act gives FERC new compe-
tences to oversee important interstate investment for which it 
had to introduce a dedicated regulatory framework (Orders 679 
and 679A). FERC has been developing new skills to do case-by-
case assessments, and has ruled on more than 85 cases, repre-
senting over 60 billion USD in potential investment, since 2006.
To access the dedicated framework, a project promoter has to 
submit a case file to FERC, that: identifies the project, provides 
evidence of the investment’s eligibility (e.g. project’s inclusion 
in a regional transmission plan that assesses reliability impact), 
motivates the incentives requested, and demonstrates the link 
between each individual incentive and the project and between 
the total incentive package and the project (e.g. with feasibility 
studies, testimony, etc.). Furthermore, to get a premium return 
on investment, the project promoter must demonstrate that 
risk has been minimized as much as possible (e.g. by requesting 
risk-reducing incentives, by implementing best practices, by 
studying alternatives, etc.).
FERC then reviews the case file, deciding if the proposed project 
is eligible and to what extent the claimed incentives are effec-
tively granted. A review of past cases shows that FERC does not 
refrain from declining eligibility due to insufficient evidence of 
a project’s “importance”, sometimes still granting the claimed 
incentives – fully or partially – conditional on a second review of 
additional evidence of a project’s importance. 
FERC typically grants all risk-mitigating incentives requested, 
but tends to adjust the claimed premiums on return on invest-
ment downwards (e.g. 1.50% claimed, but only 1.00% granted) 
after taking into account the risk-mitigating incentives that have 
been granted as part of the total incentive package. A typically 
claimed risk-mitigating incentive is the possibility to recover 
all costs from a stranded investment. FERC is aware that such 
incentive can imply significantly overpaying for bad projects 
and therefore makes this incentive conditional on the stranding 
being beyond the control of the project promoter and on the 
costs having been incurred efficiently. FERC then reviews both 
conditions when a promoter asks to activate the incentive after 
a project has stranded.
Over time, FERC has build up experience that makes case-by-
case rulings on incentive packages more transparent and more 
predictable. With the burden of proof lying with the project 
promoters and FERC having knowledge from all proposed pro-
jects, the typical information asymmetry between regulatory 
authority and project promoter reduces or might even reverse, 
giving the information advantage to the competent regulatory 
authority.
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Member states with a dedicated regulatory frame-
work for important investments
A	dedicated	regulatory	framework	with	a	high	degree	of	case-
by-case	 assessment	 of	 whether	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 a	 project	








In	 other	 words,	 some	 countries	 will	 move	 towards	 a	 dedi-
cated	 regulatory	 framework	 for	 projects	 of	 common	 interest	
and	others	will	not.	 In	both	 cases,	 there	 is	 a	 role	 for	 the	EU	
and	ACER	 to	play	because	projects	 of	 common	 interest	play	
an	 instrumental	 supporting	 role	 for	 achieving	 important	EU	
energy	and	climate	policy	objectives.	
The additional roles of the EU, ACER and ENTSO-E
The dedicated regulatory frameworks that have been devel-
oped to achieve national policy objectives must also apply to 
projects of common interest that are important to achieve the 
EU policy objectives. Art 7 paragraph 3 of the Regulation1 could 
be extended to granting the status of highest national signifi-
cance to projects of common interest in the context of their 
regulatory treatment.
To avoid that each NRA needs to develop the necessary skills 
to do case-by-case project assessments, ACER could be given 
the competence to assist NRAs on a voluntary basis. For some 
NRAs the costs of implementing their own dedicated frame-
work might indeed exceed the benefits, while they might still 
prefer to have a dedicated regulatory treatment for projects 







mental	 assessments,	 in	 the	manner	 such	 treatment	 is	 provided	
for	in	national	law	applicable	to	the	corresponding	type	of	energy	
infrastructure.
The role of the EU and ACER
The EU and ACER can do sunshine regulation by assessing 
all national frameworks that apply to projects of common 
interest, checking the adequacy to support high-value high-risk 
investment.1,2 
This assessment report can support ACER when it has to rule on 
a cross-border cost allocation (CBCA) where disagreement on 
incentive packages on either side of the border might be one of 
the reasons why NRAs fail to agree to a CBCA. It is indeed natural 
to discuss incentive packages when negotiating CBCA.3
ACER can assist with multi-jurisdictional coordination by 
spreading good practices such as the UK-Belgium experience 







provides	 some	 sunshine	 regulation	 by	 recording	 what	 current	
regulatory	frameworks	of	Member	States	do	in	terms	of	risk	eval-
uation	and	in	terms	of	granting	incentives.	
3.	 Meeus,	 L.,	 He,	 X.,	 2014.	 Guidance	 for	 project	 promoters	 and	
regulators	for	the	cross-border	cost	allocation	of	projects	of	com-
mon	 interest.	 Florence	 School	 of	Regulation	Policy	Brief,	 Issue	
2014/02.	January	2014.
